Issuer Directory Architecture — HOST RETIRED 2026-09-11

The standalone issuer-directory service no longer runs. The issuer surface does. SPRINT_20260722_016 AUTH-9 folded the issuer directory into Authority on 2026-09-08 and AUTH-10 retired the deployable on 2026-09-11. The host project is frozen under src/__Obsoleted/Authority/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.WebService/; the compose key, the publish key and the issuerdirectory.stella-ops.local alias are gone.

What serves the surface now. stellaops-authority maps the same endpoint groups from the library src/Authority/__Libraries/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Api/ through IssuerDirectoryFold, and the gateway routes /issuer-directory to authority by a static ReverseProxy rule. The issuer schema moved into stellaops_authority at the fold window; the schema NAME is unchanged (D-AUTH3-1).

Paths, scopes and payloads are UNCHANGED, which is why this dossier is still useful rather than merely historical: api-reference.mdand openapi/v1.json remain accurate about the API. What is out of date anywhere below is the deployment framing — a separate container, its own base URL, its own host project and, since AUTH-10, the StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.WebService.* namespace, which is now StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Api.*.

Canonical current dossier: ../authority/architecture.md(issuer sections 21.2 and 21.4).

Read the runtime sections below as the folded host’s behaviour, not a separate process: there is no longer an IssuerDirectory Program.cs, Kestrel listener, health endpoint or container of its own. Composition, authentication, tenancy middleware and the migration chain are Authority’s. Four divergences from the retired host’s composition are recorded in SPRINT_20260722_016 as D-AUTH5B-14…17, and the fold’s own wiring defects as AUTH-19/AUTH-21.

Owned by the Authority domain (Sprint 216, 2026-03-04). The IssuerDirectory source tree moved under src/Authority/. Schema and DbContext ownership are documented canonically in the Authority architecture dossier (sections 21.1–21.4); this document describes the IssuerDirectory service’s own runtime, API, persistence, and observability surface as implemented.

Source of truth

• Endpoint + contract library (current): src/Authority/__Libraries/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Api/, composed by Authority through IssuerDirectoryFold — namespace StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Api.*
• Retired service host: src/__Obsoleted/Authority/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.WebService/ (frozen)
• Domain + application services: src/Authority/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Core/
• Infrastructure (seed loader, persistence wiring): src/Authority/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Infrastructure/
• Persistence library: src/Authority/__Libraries/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Persistence/
• Client library: src/Authority/__Libraries/StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Client/ (shared with Excititor, DeltaVerdict)
• Schema/DbContext ownership rationale: Authority architecture dossier § 21.1–21.4
• Canonical scope catalog: src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions/StellaOpsScopes.cs

1. Purpose

Issuer Directory centralises trusted VEX/CSAF publisher metadata so downstream Stella Ops services (VEX Lens, Excititor, Policy Engine) can resolve issuer identity, active signing keys, and trust weights. It provides tenant-scoped CRUD APIs with an audit trail, key lifecycle management (add/rotate/revoke), tenant trust-weight overrides, and a bootstrap import for CSAF publishers.

This dossier is for engineers and operators integrating with the Issuer Directory service; it documents the runtime, API surface, persistence schema, and observability as implemented.

2. Runtime topology

• Service name (Router): issuerdirectory (registered via AddRouterMicroservice). Container image stellaops/issuer-directory-web:dev, container name stellaops-issuer-directory (devops/compose/docker-compose.stella-services.yml). (Historically stellaops/issuer-directory — an operator grepping compose for that bare name finds nothing.)
• Framework: ASP.NET Core minimal APIs (net10.0), WebApplication host.
• Persistence: PostgreSQL is mandatory outside Testing. The default schema is issuer (IssuerDirectoryDataSource.DefaultSchemaName). In-memory persistence is registered only when Persistence:Provider=InMemory and the environment is Testing; otherwise startup throws.
• AuthZ: StellaOps resource-server scopes (issuer-directory:read, issuer-directory:write, issuer-directory:admin), enforced via three named authorization policies (see § 4).
• Audit: Every create/update/delete/seed/key/trust mutation writes an issuer-domain audit row through IIssuerAuditSink; the service also wires unified audit emission via AddAuditEmission (posts events to the Timeline service).
• CSAF bootstrap: When SeedCsafPublishers=true (default), the service loads CsafSeedPath (default csaf-publishers.json) on startup and seeds publishers into the directory, recording a seeded audit per publisher.
• Health: anonymous GET /healthz (liveness, predicate always false → 200 when the process responds) and GET /readyz (readiness, default predicate). A build-info endpoint is exposed for the operator verify aggregator (fallbackModuleName=issuerdirectory).

Clients ──> Authority (JWT) ──> IssuerDirectory WebService ──> PostgreSQL (schema: issuer)
                                       │
                                       ├─> IIssuerAuditSink (PostgreSQL audit table)
                                       └─> Unified audit emission ──> Timeline service

3. Configuration

Configuration binds to IssuerDirectoryWebServiceOptions (section name IssuerDirectory, env prefix ISSUERDIRECTORY_). Verified keys:

Auto-migration is wired: IssuerDirectoryPersistenceRuntime calls AddStartupMigrations<IssuerDirectoryWebServiceOptions> (module IssuerDirectory.Persistence, migrations assembly = IssuerDirectoryDataSource.Assembly) so a fresh database converges to the configured schema on startup.

4. API surface

All endpoints live under the /issuer-directory/issuers route group. Write/delete operations accept an optional audit reason via the X-StellaOps-Reason header (IssuerDirectoryHeaders.AuditReason); trust PUT also accepts a reason in the body.

Tenancy contract (claim-bound)

Sprint SPRINT_20260712_001 (TEN-3) moved tenant resolution off the wire header and onto the authenticated identity. TenantResolver (WebService/Services/TenantResolver.cs) now applies:

Why reads still honour the header: StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Client sends the tenant header and no bearer token, and Excititor / Policy Engine / ReleaseOrchestrator resolve issuer keys and trust weights through it over the backend network (Authority:BypassNetworks). Reads are non-destructive; the 2026-07-11 audit finding was that a mutation from that same tokenless bypass shape could rewrite another tenant’s VEX-consensus trust weights. Mutations are therefore claim-bound and a bypass-network caller — which carries no principal, hence no tenant claim — can no longer write into a tenant it merely names.

The failure vocabulary (error_code problem extension: tenant_missing, tenant_conflict, tenant_unknown) mirrors the platform’s StellaOpsTenantEndpointFilter. All tenant failures are 400, matching the platform mapping (not Attestor’s 403 tenant_claim_mismatch).

Authorization policies (IssuerDirectoryPolicies): IssuerDirectory.Reader → read scope, IssuerDirectory.Writer → write scope, IssuerDirectory.Admin → admin scope. Each maps to the configured scope via AddStellaOpsScopePolicy (honors BypassNetworks). When Authority:Enabled=false, all three policies allow any request (anonymous mode).

Issuers

Issuer keys (nested under {issuerId}/keys)

Operator decision-signing keys (ADR-025 / AUTH-OPSIGN-002)

The stable enrolled-key contract consumed by the rest of the operator-signed-decisions program (WS3/WS4/WS5/WS6/WS7) — the frozen field shape, the policy.trusted_keys verification-view delta, and the Authority→Policy pull-by-keyId sync — lives in docs/modules/authority/operator-signing-key-contract.md(AUTH-OPSIGN-006). This section documents the enrolment surface; that doc is the contract.

A separate, account-scoped enrolment surface for operator decision-signing public keys (the operator-decision@v1 predicate). Distinct from the issuer-scoped key endpoints above:

• The key is always bound to the enrolling operator’s sub from the verified token — a client-supplied subjectId is honoured only when it matches and is otherwise rejected (400); it is never trusted on its own.
• Non-custodial: only the public key (or qualified certificate) is accepted. Private-key material is rejected (400, IssuerKeyValidator.RejectPrivateKeyMaterial).
• Every operation is fresh-auth-gated: a token carrying authority:signing-keys.enroll or authority:signing-keys.admin is rejected by StellaOpsScopeAuthorizationHandler unless its auth_time is within the freshness window (403); a missing scope is 403, an unauthenticated request 401.
• Every operation audits the operator sub, algorithmId, providerHint, and the fresh-auth claims (auth_time/acr/amr) via IIssuerAuditSink; approval also records approver_sub.
• Optional dual-control (IssuerDirectory:OperatorSigningKeys:RequireDualControl=true): the enrolled key starts Pending and stays inactive until a second approver (distinct sub, holding authority:signing-keys.admin) promotes it. Self-approval is rejected (400).
• Compliance-profile auto-bind (IssuerDirectory:OperatorSigningKeys:EnforceComplianceProfile=true, the default): before enrollment, IssuerDirectory calls Platform’s narrow tenant-bound /api/v1/admin/crypto-providers/compliance-profile/operator-signing-enrollment projection with the validated operator bearer and tenant. The projection determines the canonical algorithmId and exact active providerName; the local ICryptoProviderRegistry must resolve that provider and it must report Supports(Verification, algorithmId). A client algorithm/provider mismatch is 400; an unavailable profile projection or missing active provider is 503. The same guard runs before both enrolment and rotation, so rotation cannot replace a compliant key with a caller-selected algorithm/provider. No key row is written or retired on failure. World/FIPS project ES256 browser enrollment; GOST/SM project their regional algorithm and a CLI/smartcard route, never an ES256 downgrade.
• The IssuerDirectory host registers default, fips.ecdsa.soft, and eu.eidas.soft verification identities. The FIPS/eIDAS software providers keep their existing explicit environment gates; selecting one without enabling/configuring that provider returns the fail-closed 503 rather than falling back to default. Regional verification providers remain operator/plugin configuration.
• Append-only verification history: IIssuerKeyRepository exposes no delete/remove operation. Revocation and rotation update lifecycle state while retaining the public key. Migration 003_operator_signing_key_append_only_guard.sql adds a PostgreSQL BEFORE DELETE trigger for DecisionSigning rows, so direct deletes and the historical issuer ON DELETE CASCADE path fail closed. PostgresIssuerRepository.DeleteAsync also rejects an issuer delete before mutation when that issuer owns operator decision-signing history.
• Crash-safe provider-change retirement: the provider-change mutation requires a stable non-empty operationId. IssuerDirectory canonicalizes the subject and supported-algorithm lists, then commits every affected key retirement, its per-key audit row, and one immutable receipt in a single PostgreSQL transaction. A retry with the same tenant/issuer/canonical selection returns that original receipt without retiring or auditing again, even if the configured grace period or executing service identity changed after the first attempt. Reusing an operation id for a different tenant, issuer, subject set, or algorithm set fails closed with 409. The initiating operator is persisted as originalActorSubject; the audit also records the current executing subject, while neither request nor receipt carries private key material.

Scope gotcha (CLAUDE.md §1.5): authority:signing-keys.enroll / authority:signing-keys.admin / decision-signing are JWT scope claim values that double as the ASP.NET policy names (the endpoints register RequireAuthorization(<scope>) with the same literal). The freshness gate is applied by StellaOpsScopeAuthorizationHandler for any token presenting these scopes, so applying the policy is sufficient to require a recent step-up.

Issuer trust (nested under {issuerId}/trust)

Request/response contracts

• IssuerUpsertRequest: Id, DisplayName, Slug (required), Description?, Contact (IssuerContactRequest: Email, Phone, Website, Timezone), Metadata (IssuerMetadataRequest: CveOrgId, CsafPublisherId, SecurityAdvisoriesUrl, CatalogUrl, Languages[], Attributes{}), Endpoints[] (IssuerEndpointRequest: Kind (default csaf), Url, Format?, RequiresAuth), Tags[]. (Slug is required on create/update but is not separately re-validated against the existing record on update.)
• IssuerResponse: Id, TenantId, DisplayName, Slug, Description?, Contact, Metadata, Endpoints[], Tags[], CreatedAtUtc, CreatedBy, UpdatedAtUtc, UpdatedBy, IsSystemSeed.
• IssuerKeyCreateRequest / IssuerKeyRotateRequest: Type (parsed case-insensitively to IssuerKeyType), Format, Value, ExpiresAtUtc?. (Format+Value form the IssuerKeyMaterial.)
• IssuerKeyResponse: Id, IssuerId, TenantId, Type, Status, MaterialFormat, Fingerprint, CreatedAtUtc, CreatedBy, UpdatedAtUtc, UpdatedBy, ExpiresAtUtc?, RetiredAtUtc?, RevokedAtUtc?, ReplacesKeyId?.
• OperatorSigningKeyEnrollRequest (ADR-025): Type, Format, Value (PUBLIC key only), AlgorithmId? (a SignatureAlgorithms constant), ProviderHint?, SubjectId? (must match the token sub when present), ExpiresAtUtc?.
• OperatorSigningKeyResponse (ADR-025): KeyId, IssuerId, TenantId, SubjectId, Type, Status, MaterialFormat, PublicKey (the stored public IssuerKeyRecord.Material.Value), AlgorithmId?, ProviderHint?, Purpose, Fingerprint, PendingApproval, CreatedAtUtc, ExpiresAtUtc?, ValidFromUtc, ValidUntilUtc?, RetiredAtUtc?, RevokedAtUtc?, ReplacesKeyId?. The response never contains private material; enrollment rejects it before a key can be stored.
• IssuerTrustResponse: TenantOverride?, GlobalOverride? (each a TrustOverrideSummary: Weight, Reason?, UpdatedAtUtc, UpdatedBy, CreatedAtUtc, CreatedBy), EffectiveWeight.

Domain enums

• IssuerKeyType: Ed25519PublicKey, X509Certificate, DssePublicKey.
• IssuerKeyStatus: Active, Retired, Revoked, Pending. (Pending is the dual-control hold for operator decision-signing keys — ADR-025 / AUTH-OPSIGN-002; not used by classic issuer keys.)
• IssuerKeyPurpose: Issuer (default, publisher/VEX signing), DecisionSigning (operator decision-signing key — ADR-025).

Note: the startup SQL migration’s key_type CHECK constraint lists the legacy lower-case token set (ed25519, x509, dsse, kms, hsm, fido2) and the issuers.status CHECK lists (active, revoked, deprecated). The issuer_keys.status CHECK was relaxed by migration 002_operator_signing_key_dual_control.sql to admit pending alongside active/retired/revoked. These string vocabularies are not the same surface as the C# enums above, which are the authoritative API contract.

5. Authentication and anonymous mode

• When Authority:Enabled=true, the service registers StellaOps resource-server authentication (AddStellaOpsResourceServerAuthentication) with the configured issuer, audiences, RequireHttpsMetadata, and BypassNetworks.
• When Authority:Enabled=false, an AllowAnonymous authentication handler is used and all three policies pass. IssuerDirectoryAnonymousModeGuard.Enforce permits this only in Development or Testing; any other environment throws at startup (“anonymous mode is restricted to Development/Testing local harnesses”).

6. Persistence schema (default schema issuer)

Startup migration Migrations/001_initial_schema.sql (embedded; applied by the shared migration runner under the configured search_path) creates:

• issuers — id UUID PK, tenant_id UUID (global seeds use the @global GUID), name (slug), display_name, description, endpoints/contact/metadata JSONB, tags TEXT[], status (active|revoked|deprecated), is_system_seed, created/updated audit columns. Unique (tenant_id, name).
• issuer_keys — id UUID PK, issuer_id (FK → issuers, ON DELETE CASCADE), tenant_id, key_id, key_type, public_key, fingerprint, not_before/not_after, status (active|retired|revoked), replaces_key_id, lifecycle timestamps, revoke_reason, metadata JSONB. Unique (issuer_id, key_id) and unique fingerprint.
• trust_overrides — id UUID PK, issuer_id (FK), tenant_id, weight NUMERIC(5,2) (CHECK -10..10), rationale, expires_at, audit columns. Unique (issuer_id, tenant_id).
• audit — id BIGSERIAL PK, tenant_id, actor, action, issuer_id, key_id, trust_override_id, reason, details JSONB, correlation_id, occurred_at.
• operator_provider_change_receipts — append-only operation receipt keyed globally by operation_id, with tenant/issuer identity, canonical subject and algorithm arrays, initiating and executing actor subjects, original reason/grace/time, and the ordered retired-key result as JSONB. Migration 004_operator_provider_change_receipts.sql creates the table, tenant/time index, and a BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE trigger. The receipt contains lifecycle/public identifiers only, never private key material.
• schema_migrations — migration tracking table.

Indexes cover tenant/status/slug lookups, key issuer/status/tenant, trust tenant, and audit (tenant_id, occurred_at DESC)/issuer. BEFORE UPDATE triggers maintain updated_at on issuers, issuer_keys, and trust_overrides. Startup migration 003_operator_signing_key_append_only_guard.sql adds the issuer_keys delete guard that preserves operator decision-signing public keys even when an issuer delete would otherwise cascade. Startup migration 004_operator_provider_change_receipts.sql makes provider-change retry receipts durable and append-only; PostgresOperatorProviderChangeRepository commits each receipt in the same transaction as the corresponding key lifecycle and audit mutations.

The schema isolation from AuthorityDbContext is a deliberate security feature (blast-radius containment; least privilege). See Authority architecture § 21.3.

7. Observability

OpenTelemetry meter StellaOps.IssuerDirectory (IssuerDirectoryMetrics):

• issuer_directory_changes_total — tags tenant, issuer, action. Counts issuer create/update/delete events.
• issuer_directory_key_operations_total — tags tenant, issuer, operation, key_type. Counts key create/rotate/revoke operations.
• issuer_directory_key_validation_failures_total — tags tenant, issuer, reason. Counts key validation/verification failures.

The host registers ASP.NET Core + runtime metrics instrumentation and ASP.NET Core + HttpClient tracing.

Audit actions

Issuer-domain audit rows are written with these action values (from the Core services): created, updated, deleted, seeded, key_created, key_enrollment_pending, key_retired, key_rotated, key_revoked, trust_override_set, trust_override_deleted. key_enrollment_pending is written instead of key_created when RequireDualControl is on and the key is held for a second-operator approval (IssuerKeyService.Add.cs:91). Provider-change retirement writes key_retired once per affected key with correlation id operationId; details retain both original_actor_subject and executing_actor_subject. A receipt replay writes no additional audit row.

8. Dependencies and reuse

• StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Core — domain model (IssuerRecord, IssuerKeyRecord, IssuerTrustOverrideRecord, IssuerAuditEntry) + application services (IssuerDirectoryService, IssuerKeyService, IssuerTrustService) + key validators (Ed25519/X.509/DSSE).
• StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Infrastructure — CSAF seed loader, persistence wiring.
• StellaOps.IssuerDirectory.Persistence — PostgreSQL repositories, audit sink, EF Core IssuerDirectoryDbContext with compiled models, startup migration.
• Shared libraries: StellaOps.Configuration, StellaOps.Cryptography, StellaOps.Auth.ServerIntegration (+ tenancy), StellaOps.Audit.Emission, StellaOps.Router.AspNet, StellaOps.Infrastructure.Postgres.Migrations, StellaOps.Localization.

9. Archived / superseded documentation

• Archived original dossier: docs-archive/modules/issuer-directory/architecture.md (and operations/*). The archived YAML sample and table-name configuration (schema: issuer_directory, issuersTable/auditTable keys) describe the pre-Sprint-216 design and do not match the current implementation; treat this document and the Authority dossier § 21 as authoritative.